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I. INTRODUCTION
In the movies, a sweat-drenched, disheveled John Rambo' fights
through clinging jungle vines with guns blazing as he mows down his
enemies. In law offices across the country, the John Rambos of the legal
world are invading deposition rooms, yelling obscenities at opposing
counsel, and attempting to mow down their "enemies" with nasty verbal
invectives. Unlike the silver screen stars, the John Rambos of the legal
world are not heroes. Instead, they are ruining the practice of law for
those engaged in the legitimate process of civil discovery.
These "Rambo lawyers" justify their rude, profane, and intimidating
1. See DAVID MORRELL, FIRST BLOOD (1972). One of the ironies of the term "Rambo" as
applied to rude litigators is that even though the original John Rambo was a trained killer, he was
slow to anger and did not kill until pushed. Those he ultimately defeated had drawn "first blood,"
giving him no choice but to respond. If Rambo lawyers did the same, i.e., responded in a "Rambo-
like" way only when "pushed," they might be respected instead of condemned.
[VCol. 25:561
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language by claiming that their clients expect them to be the toughest,
most obnoxious lawyers in the deposition room. They argue that high
stakes require "hard-ball" tactics, including intimidation of the opposing
attorney. They declare that their job is to seize control of the deposition,
and the earlier they can assert their dominance in the deposition room,
the more information they can hide from their opponent.2
In the movies, John Rambo acts outside the law to achieve justice.
The heroic results he achieves justify the illegal acts he employs. In the
deposition room, the John Rambos of the litigation world act outside the
rules of "civil" discovery and claim that the ethical proscription to
"zealously represent" their clients justifies their behavior.3 They are
wrong. Their tactics in the deposition room are indefensible and must be
stopped.
The control of this growing cancer in the civil litigation system is
important but frustrating. Before the bench, practicing bar, and academic
world can control Rambo in the deposition room, we must arrive at a
definition of unacceptable behavior in depositions. Included in this
Article are transcripts of depositions that illustrate extremely rude
comments by attorneys to their legal opponents. From these cases, this
2. For a definition of Rambo litigation tactics, see Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home Rambo:
High-Minded Ethics and Low-Down Tactics in the Courts, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 81, 81 n.2 (1991)
(equating Rambo litigation tactics with "scorched earth," "take no prisoners," and "Godzilla
litigation"). See also The Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 216 (1992) [hereinafter Judicial Conference] (Judge Nies,
during his discussion of "The Rambo litigator," defined a Rambo lawyer as an "uncivil lawyer.').
One commentator has described the six traits of a Rambo litigator as follows:
[I.] A mindset that litigation is war and that describes trial practice in military terms.
[2.] A conviction that it is invariably in your interest to make life miserable for your
opponent.
[3.] A disdain for common courtesy and civility, assuming that they ill-befit the true
warrior.
[4.] A wondrous facility for manipulating facts and engaging in revisionist history.
[5.] A hair-trigger willingness to fire off unnecessary motions and to use discovery for
intimidation rather than fact-finding.
[6.] An urge to put the trial lawyer on center stage rather than the client or his cause.
Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988,
at 79.
3. There is a tension in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility between an attorney's
duty to zealously represent his clients and a duty to prevent any ill feeling that may exist between
the clients from carrying over to the relationship between the opposing attorneys. See MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONStBiLiTY EC 7-1, 7-37 (1981). "In adversary proceedings, clients are
litigants and though ill feeling may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a
lawyer in his conduct, attitude and demeanor towards opposing lawyers." Id. EC 7-37.
1996]
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Article proposes a point of unity at which certain behavior is unaccept-
able in any context.
Once we have a consensus that certain behavior is unacceptable, we
can approach the harder question for the practicing bar, the courts, and
the law schools-how to stop the cruel name-calling and personal attacks
by attorneys toward each other without resorting to blanket orders and
rules that interfere with an attorney's ability to provide effective
representation to his client.
The use of the extreme examples contained in this Article hopefully
will set the stage for a bright-line distinction between what all can agree
is acceptable and unacceptable behavior among attorneys in depositions.
The ensuing danger from an analysis of these compelling examples is
that courts may jump to the conclusion that the only way to control the
behavior of an offending attorney is to prohibit all attorneys from taking
certain actions at a deposition. This Article is intended to set the stage
for a thoughtful discussion of how to control the egregious behavior of
a few without severely restricting the discovery process for all.
The secondary goal of this Article is to persuade inexperienced
attorneys that they do not have to endure the trial by fire fanned by the
Rambo lawyers. While most lawyers condemn these Rambo tactics, and
many courts and legal opponents have begun to develop effective
responses, most litigating attorneys seem to believe that nothing can be
done to control the John Rambos of the legal profession once they enter
the deposition room.
This Article seeks to dispel the cynical belief that nothing can be
done, by focusing on several examples of outrageous behavior among
attorneys where courts have responded with severe sanctions. These cases
demonstrate that courts can and do impose sanctions on outrageous
behavior when asked.
The cases also show that the rules are already in place to control the
behavior. The enactment of more rules to control a harmful, but
relatively small proportion of the practicing bar is not necessary.4 What
is needed is swifter enforcement of the existing rules, training of
attorneys as to how to effectively handle Rambo opponents, and
discussion among all members of the legal community centering on
4. "It's a rare thing to see Rambo tactics. The vast majority, overwhelming majority of
lawyers practice professionally and competently in my courtroom." Judicial Conference, supra note
2, at 230 (comments of the Hon. Marvin E. Aspen, District Court Judge, United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Chair of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal
Judicial Circuit); see also infra Part IV.
[Vol. 25:561
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condemnation and elimination of the verbal attacks of other attorneys
occurring out of the presence of judges in deposition rooms across the
country.5
Part II of this Article presents the transcripts of three egregious
examples of Rambo behavior occurring during depositions. Part I
demonstrates how this Rambo behavior hurts every constituency of the
legal system. Part IV describes the current remedies that are available to
control Rambo behavior. Part V proposes six ways the bench, the bar,
and the law school community can control the behavior without enacting
new rules, codes of conduct, or orders that limit the behavior of all
attorneys during depositions.
Rambo lawyers in depositions can and must be stopped. This can be
accomplished if each of the affected constituencies (courts, lawyers, law
schools, clients, and members of the public) drop their passivity and
affirmatively act to control their unwitting acceptance of the Rambo
cancer.
II. EGREGIOUS EXAMPLES OF DEPOSITION CONDUCT
Unfortunately, "Rambo lawyers" are not just lurking in the back
rooms of state courts. They are asserting themselves in the plush offices
of corporate law firms and in multi-party federal court cases. Their
deposition tactics distract clients, lawyers, and courts from the purpose
of civil discovery and instead embroil all concerned in needless and
costly satellite litigation.
Three transcripts, gleaned froia federal and state court decisions,
illustrate recent "Rambo tactics" employed in the deposition room and
the severe judicial response to the unprofessional behavior.
In the first case, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc.,6 Mr. Johnston, Delaware counsel for the defendant, QVC, arranged
to take a deposition of a witness, J. Hugh Liedtke, in Texas. Joseph D.
Jamail appeared on behalf of Mr. Liedtke at the Texas deposition. Mr.
Jamail did not make a formal appearance in the Delaware proceeding but
5. See infra Part V.
6. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
7. Joe Jamail is best known for winning a $10.53 billion jury verdict in 1987 on behalf of
his client, Pennzoil Company, against Texaco, Inc. L. Hugh Liedtke, whom he represented at the
deposition in Paramount Communications, Inc., was also chairman of the board of directors of
Pennzoil Company. See Benjamin Weiser, Are Too! Am Not! Are Too! Am Not!: Judges Try to
Impose a Civil Tone as Depositions Get Increasingly Down and Dirty, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1994,
at B10.
19961
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attended the deposition as private counsel for the deponent.8 The
following exchange occurred during Mr. Liedtke's deposition:
A. [Mr. Liedtke:] I vaguely recall [Mr. Oresman's letter].... I think
I did read it, probably.
Q. (By Mr. Johnston [Delaware counsel for QVC]) Okay. Do you have
any idea why Mr. Oresman was calling that material to your attention?
MR. JAMAIL: Don't answer that.
How would he know what was going on in Mr. Oresman's mind?
Don't answer it.
Go on to your next question.
MR. JOHNSTON: No, Joe--
MR. JAMAIL: He's not going to answer that. Certify it. I'm going to
shut it down if you don't go to your next question.
MR. JOHNSTON: No. Joe, Joe--
MR. JAMAIL: Don't "Joe" me, asshole. You can ask some questions,
but get off of that. I'm tired of you. You could gag a maggot off a
meat wagon. Now, we've helped you every way we can.
MR. JOHNSTON: Let's just take it easy.
MR. JAMAIL: No, we're not going to take it easy. Get done with this.
MR. JOHNSTON: We will go on to the next question.
MR. JAMAIL: Do it now.
MR. JOHNSTON: We will go on to the next question. We're not trying
to excite anyone.
MR. JAMAIL: Come on. Quit talking. Ask the question. Nobody wants
to socialize with you.
MR. JOHNSTON: I'm not trying to socialize. We'll go on to another
question. We're continuing the deposition.
MR. JAMAIL: Well, go on and shut up.
MR. JOHNSTON: Are you finished?
MR. JAMAIL: Yeah, you-
MR. JOHNSTON: Are you finished?
MR. JAMAIL: I may be and you may be. Now, you want to sit here
and talk to me, fine. This deposition is going to be over with. You
don't know what you're doing. Obviously someone wrote out a long
outline of stuff for you to ask. You have no concept of what you're
doing.
Now, I've tolerated you for three hours. If you've got another
question, get on with it. This is going to stop one hour from now,
period. Go.
MR. JOHNSTON: Are you finished?
8. See id.
[Vol. 25:561
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MR. THOMAS: Come on, Mr. Johnston, move it.
MR. JOHNSTON: I don't need this kind of abuse.
MR. THOMAS: Then just ask the next question.
Q. (By Mr. Johnston) All right. To try to move forward, Mr.
Liedtke,... I'll show you what's been marked as Liedtke 14 and it is
a covering letter dated October 29 from Steven Cohen of Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz including QVC's Amendment Number 1 to its
Schedule 14D-l, and my question-
A. No.
Q. -- to you, sir, is whether you've seen that?
A. No. Look, I don't know what your intent in asking all these
questions is, but, my God, I am not going to play boy lawyer.
Q. Mr. Liedtke-
A. Okay. Go ahead and ask your question.
Q. -I'm trying to move forward in this deposition that we are entitled
to take. I'm trying to streamline it.
MR. JAMAIL: Come on with your next question. Don't even talk with
this witness.
MR. JOHNSTON: I'm trying to move forward with it.
MR. JAMAIL: You understand me? Don't talk to this witness except
by question. Did you hear me?
MR. JOHNSTON: I heard you fine.
MR. JAMAIL: You fee makers think you can come here and sit in
somebody's office, get your meter running, get your full day's fee by
asking stupid questions. Let's go with it.9
The Delaware Supreme Court was so outraged by the behavior of Mr.
Jamail that it raised the issue of professionalism sua sponte in an
addendum to a lengthy opinion on the merits of the case.10 The court
characterized the behavior of Mr. Jamail as "extraordinarily rude, uncivil,
and vulgar,"'" and concluded that "[t]his kind of misconduct is not to
be tolerated in any Delaware court proceeding, including depositions
taken in other states in which witnesses appear represented by their own
counsel."' 2 The court then gave Mr. Jamail thirty days to make a
voluntary appearance to show cause why his conduct should not be a bar
to any future appearance in a Delaware proceeding. 3
9. Paramount Communications, Inc., 637 A.2d at 53-54 (addendum to the opinion relating
to the issue of professionalism in depositions) (alterations in original).
10. See id. at 52 n.23.
11. Id. at 53.
12. Id. at 56.
13. See id. Mr. Jamail did not respond to the Delaware Supreme Court. See Telephone
Interview with Gail Laferty, Attorney, Delaware Supreme Court Clerk's Office (Sept. 5, 1995). He
1996]
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Other courts have been similarly quick to stop the spreading cancer
of Rambo tactics in depositions once they have been alerted to the
problem. In Principe v. Assay Partners,14 Beth Rex, an associate in a
law firm, was representing the fourth-party defendant in a deposition
when Lawrence Clarke, another attorney at the deposition, made the
following remarks to Ms. Rex in front of numerous attorneys, the
witness, and the reporter:
"I don't have to talk to you, little lady";
"Tell that little mouse over there to pipe down";
"What do you know, young girl";
"Be quiet, little girl";
"Go away, little girl.' 5
Ms. Rex stated that these comments "were accompanied by disparaging
gestures... dismissively flicking his fingers and waving a back hand at
me. 16 The court examined the transcript and the accompanying
affidavit and concluded that the words used by Mr. Clarke "are a
paradigm of rudeness, and condescend, disparage, and degrade a
colleague upon the basis that she is female."' 7 The court condemned
Mr. Clarke's behavior as unprofessional conduct:
Offensive or abusive language by counsel is not proper professional
conduct. An attorney who exhibits a lack of civility, good manners and
common courtesy tarnishes the image of the legal profession, and an
attorney's "conduct... that projects offensive and invidious discrimi-
natory distinctions... based on race... or gender... is especially
offensive."'"
Judge Diane A. Lebedeff found that Mr. Clarke's behavior was not
confined to a single incident, but that the objectionable remarks and
was quoted in The Wall Street Journal as saying that he was not concerned about the ruling by the
Delaware Supreme Court. See Wade Lambert, Jamail's Vitriolic Talk in Delaware Leads to a 16-
Page Court Rebuke, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1994, at B6. He referred to the judges as "bureaucrats in
robes," and he speculated that the judge who wrote the opinion "thinks he is Emily Post." Id. Jamail
also expressed no interest in appearing in Delaware cases. See id.
When The Washington Post writer, Benjamin Weiser, questioned Jamail about the Delaware
ruling, Jamail responded, "The judges are confused by real-life advocacy .... They want to make
lawyers dance to their tune of mediocrity .... I can only assume that they are frustrated in their
jobs." Weiser, supra note 7, at B10.
14. 586 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
15. Id. at 184.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 25:561
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conduct were repeated several times. 9 The court decided that it did not
"need to inquire whether the offensive remarks and conduct sprang from
a misogynous or other maladapted point of view and acknowledge[d] that
they could have stemmed from a tactical desire to make opposing
counsel uncomfortable."2 The court complimented both Ms. Rex's law
firm and its corporate client for refusing to allow insulting behavior
toward a woman associate during a deposition to remain a "dirty little
secret."2' Judge Lebedeff wrote:
It is clear that they prize Ms. Rex, who is, in fact, an able attorney
whose vigorous prose and oral argument have been observed by this
court during the conduct of this litigation. Seeking sanctions from this
court is not a display of an inability to overlook obnoxious conduct, but
an indication of a commitment to basic concepts of justice and respect
for the mores of the profession of law. The movant has turned to the
court to give force to a basic professional tenet.
2
The court then fined Mr. Clarke $500 to be paid to the Clients' Security
Fund and $500 to be paid to the movant's attorney as a reasonable
attorney's fee.23 The court further directed that these fines were to be
paid by Mr. Clarke personally and not by his client.24
In the third case in this series the federal district court, in Castillo
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,25 took swift steps to curb the
plaintiff's and his counsel's behavior. Discovery had gotten off to a
rocky start with the plaintiff's first deposition, in which his counsel
instructed him not to answer numerous questions.26 Defense counsel
sought answers to their unanswered questions through a motion to
compel.27 The court assessed fees and expenses of $6,317.66 against the
plaintiff and his counsel and ordered that the questions that had not been
answered at the first deposition be answered forthwith.2' At the second
deposition, James Walker, another attorney from the same firm that
19. See id. at 186.
20. Id. at 187.
21. Id. at 185.
22. Id. at 186.
23. See id. at 190-91.
24. See id. at 189.
25. 828 F. Supp. 594 (C.D. Ill. 1992). For more information about the circumstances
surrounding this case, see Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 938 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.
1991).
26. See Castillo, 828 F. Supp. at 596.
27. See id. at 596-97.
28. See id. at 597.
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represented the plaintiff in the first deposition, appeared for the
plaintiff.29
Defense counsel had to abort this second deposition when the
plaintiff's counsel instructed his client not to answer several questions
that the court had ordered him to answer.30 One of the defense attorneys
suggested that the attorneys seek an immediate judicial ruling by calling
the judge, a remedy proposed by the trial judge at the first court hearing
on the motion to compel.3" When the defense counsel attempted to call
the judge, the following colloquy occurred on the record:
MR. WALKER: I would caution you not to use any telephones in this
office unless you are invited to do so, counsel.
MR. STANKO: You're telling me I can't use your telephones?
MR. WALKER: You can write your threatening letters to me. But, you
step outside this room and touch the telephone, and I'll take care of
that in the way one does who has possessory rights.32
After reviewing the record described above, the trial court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice and found the plaintiff's counsel in civil
contempt, which could be purged by paying the expenses and fees of the
defense.33 The court then referred plaintiff's counsel to a three-judge
panel to determine the appropriate discipline.34
The three-judge panel found that it had the "inherent power and
responsibility to supervise the conduct of attorneys who are admitted to
practice before it."35 It then condemned Mr. Walker's failure to
apologize and his attempt to justify his behavior by claiming that his
conduct was consistent with the ordinary practice of other lawyers in the
district:
Mr. Walker's knowing, deliberate, and willful disobedience of Judge
Baker's order is discovery abuse of a genre never before seen by this
Court. Mr. Walker's conduct is also the most egregious example of
lawyer incivility that this Court has ever seen. Further, even if Mr.
Walker's assessment of the general level of deposition practice were
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 598.
35. Id.
[Vol. 25:561
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accurate, which it is not, this would not excuse Mr. Walker's unprofes-
sional conduct.36
The three-judge panel then suspended Walker from the practice of law
for one year.
37
The Rambo tactics employed by the attorneys in depositions in these
three cases threw a monkey wrench into the civil discovery process and
interfered with their opponents' right to obtain information. In two of
these cases the lawyers victimized by these Rambo attorneys had to
engage in needless satellite discovery to obtain information. Rambo
lawyers who delay, distract, and eventually stop the gathering of
information in depositions are part of the larger problem of abuse of the
rules of civil discovery. These lawyers are perhaps the most important
part of the problem because depositions are probably a lawyer's most
effective discovery tool.
The above examples show three situations in which attorneys used
name-calling and threats to intimidate their legal opponents. These
Rambos attempted to gain a tactical advantage by demeaning their
opponents. None of the above comments slipped out in the heat of battle,
nor were they isolated. They were both intentional and strategic. In the
first case, Joe Jamail intended to slow access to information by insulting
the deposing attorney and attempting to throw him off his game plan.38
In the second case, Lawrence Clarke made at least five different
demeaning comments designed to anger and humiliate his opponent
during the course of one deposition.39 In the third case, Mr. Walker
intentionally ignored a court order to provide information and threatened
his opponent when he sought judicial relief.4"
Based on these cases and the cases described below, this Article
proposes that the bench, the bar, and the academic community agree that
name-calling, demeaning gestures, and personal threats are unacceptable
in any context. They are particularly reprehensible when they are used
in an attempt to obtain a strategic advantage in a deposition.
36. Id. at 600.
37. See id. at 604.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 6-13.
39. See supra text accompanying note 15.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 25-37.
19961
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III. THE GROWTH OF THE RAMBO CANCER AT DEPOSITIONS-HURTS
EVERY CONSTITUENCY IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The John Rambos of the deposition room consume enormous
amounts of time, energy, and money. Judges, lawyers, litigants, and the
general public all pay the price of the obstreperous tactics used by these
legal "warriors" during "civil" discovery.
A. Courts
Instead of devoting valuable judicial time to the resolution of
meritorious issues, judges are wasting time controlling these legal bullies.
Hearings on motions to compel must be scheduled, briefs must be read,
arguments must be attended, and time consuming orders must be drafted
in order to control the John Rambos of the deposition room.
Judges hate playing the role of the parent who must resolve petty
disputes among attorneys in the deposition process.41 Some judges have
become so annoyed with Rambo deposition tactics that they have ordered
all future depositions in a particular case to take place at the courthouse
so that they can promptly intervene to stop unruly behavior.42 Although
an order to conduct depositions at the courthouse achieves results,43 the
implementing judge loses even more valuable time supervising a process
that should not require judicial involvement.
Other judges have avoided the personal cost of daily supervision by
appointing discovery masters to monitor future depositions.44 In a
41. See Martha Middleton, Judging Well: Controlling Rambo Litigators, PROF. LAW., Aug.
1992, at 1; see also Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 1991)
("We find this unfortunate situation... professionally disagreeable .... Hopefully we will be
spared further cases of this nature which only thwart and disrupt our judicial processes....').
42. See Guerrero v. Board of Edue., No. C92-2971, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, at *17-18
(N.D. Cal. July 5, 1994) (order imposing disciplinary action), rev'd on other grounds, No. 94-16415,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34992 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1995).
43. See hi. at *18. The court had to supervise several depositions by requiring that the
depositions be conducted at the courthouse so that the court was available to resolve disputes. The
court noted that "[d]uring these depositions, [it] never received a complaint of inappropriate
conduct." Id.
44. See Van Pilsum v. Iowa State Univ. of Science & Tech., 152 F.RD. 179 (S.D. Iowa 1993)
(order imposing sanctions and granting protective order). The court stated:
The use of a discovery master is rare in this district. However, the acrimony
which exists between these counsel does not serve their clients or the justice system. It
necessitates the provision of day care for counsel who, like small children, cannot get
along and require adult supervision. Although this is an added expense to the clients it
will save time and money in the long run by the more efficient progress of discovery and
[Vol. 25:561
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particular case, some have assigned magistrates to oversee future
depositions.4" Other judges have gone so far as to prohibit all off-the-
record consultation between an attorney and his witness once the
deposition has begun.46
Regardless of the remedy they have chosen, judges are finding that
Rambo tactics obstruct the search for truth that discovery should
promote.
B. Lawyers
Over and over, the lawyers who have been victimized by the John
Rambos of the deposition room complain that these few lawyers take the
pleasure out of practicing law.47 In his report to the Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Marvin E.
Aspen explained that the survey conducted among the lawyers and the
the elimination of time spent in motions to compel.
Id. at 181.
45. See R.W. Int'l Corp. v. Welch Foods, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.P.R. 1990), rev'd, 937 F.2d
11 (1st Cir. 1991); American Directory Serv. Agency, Inc. v. Beam, 131 F.R.D. 15, 16 (D.D.C.
1990) (order imposing sanctions).
46. See Johnson v. Wayne Manor Apartments, 152 F.R.D. 56, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (order
directing submission to depositions and payment of sanctions); Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D.
525, 531-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (order concerning conduct during depositions). For a thoughtful article
on the negative consequences of blanket rules prohibiting discussions between attorneys and their
witnesses during the course of a deposition, see David H. Taylor, Rambo as Potted Plant: Local
Rulemaking's Preemptive Strike Against Witness-Coaching During Depositions, 40 VILL. L. REV.
1057 (1995).
47. See Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit,
143 F.R.D. 371, 388 (1991) [hereinafter Interim Report]. The Committee found that 94% of the
lawyers who perceived a civility problem targeted discovery as the primary setting for uncivil
conduct, see id. at 380, and concluded that depositions were one of the most uncivil phases of trial
practice, see id at 388. One commentator noted:
Dirty tricks are an unfortunate reality in the practice of law. We have all faced
the aggravation and frustration generated by cases where the opposing lawyer relies on
dirty tricks to gain an upper hand. And we have all wished that these "Rambo" lawyers
could somehow be made to pay for their tricks.
Marsha B. Elser, Making Them Pay for Dirty Tricks, FAIRSHARE, May 1993, at 6.
Eugene A. Cook, Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, has been outspoken against the
tactics of Rambo litigators. "These Rambo litigators taint the heritage of the profession and wring
the enjoyment and pleasure from the law practice, which should be exciting, challenging, and
rewarding." Eugene A. Cook et al., A Guide to the Texas Lawyer's Creed: A Mandate for
Professionalism, 10 REV. LrITG. 673, 674 (1991) [hereinafter Cook et al., Mandate for Professional-
ism] (footnote omitted). "The Rambo litigators commit three great sins: they take the fun out of
practicing law, they make legal representation unaffordable for middle America, and they crowd our
already congested dockets." Eugene A. Cook, Professionalism and the Practice of Law, 23 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 955, 970 (1992) [hereinafter Cook, Practice of Law].
19961
HeinOnline  -- 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 573 1996-1997
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW
judiciary of the Seventh Circuit found "widespread dissatisfaction among
judges and lawyers at the gradual changing of the practice of law from
an occupation characterized by congenial professional relationships to
one of abrasive confrontations."4 Personal attacks in a deposition room
create painful job stress and frayed tempers. Victims of this verbal abuse
dread entering the deposition room.
The Rambos of the deposition room often focus their tirades on the
most vulnerable opponent--the new attorney. Like sharks circling at the
smell of blood, the John Rambos of the deposition room appear to smell
the inexperience and fear of these new attorneys. Instead of acting as
mentors to the new attorney, or even as "worthy opponents," Rambos
take advantage of the new attorney with intimidating language and
sarcastic insults.49
Rambo lawyers appear to take particular delight in demeaning
inexperienced young women attorneys.50 Although there are certainly
48. Interim Report, supra note 47, at 375.
49. See DAVID M. MALONE & PETERT. HOFFMAN, THE EFFECTIVE DEPOSmON: TECHNIQUES
AND STRATEGIES THAT WORK 192 (Nat'l Inst. for Trial Advocacy ed., 1993).
In Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 115 F.R.D. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (order imposing
sanctions on plaintiffs' counsel), the defending attorney accused the examining attorney of being "an
obnoxious little twit," and "a very rude and impertinent young man" and instructed him to keep his
mouth shut. Id. at 293. When the examining attorney cautioned the defending attorney that his
conduct would result in a request to the court for sanctions, the defending attorney countered, "[i]f
you want to go down to Judge Pollack and ask for sanctions because of that, go ahead. I would
almost agree to make a contribution of cash to you if you would promise to use it to take a course
in how to ask questions in a deposition." Id.; see also Stengel v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 116 F.R.D.
263, 267-68 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (granting discovery sanctions in favor of the plaintiff's attorney for
the defendant attorneys' "unprofessional and insulting sidebar comments").
50. See Stengel, 116 F.R.D. at 263; Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (Sup.
Ct. 1992). In Stengel, there is a description of a hearing at which the female court reporter testified
that when the plaintiff's counsel left the room for a short recess, two of the defense's counsel and
deponent's attorney engaged in a conversation in which they made it plain that they were going to
intentionally 'Jerk" the plaintiff's counsel around. The following examples of comments made
toward the plaintiff's counsel during the remainder of the deposition illustrate the result of this
agreement:
"[H]ow much can you tell us about what you did on October 2, 1984, Ma'am?" (This
statement was obviously directed to counsel for the Plaintiff.)...
"Counsel, either you are not listening to the witness or you are trying to badger him I
don't know which it is... "'
"[P]erhaps Ms. Stone could take her own deposition."
"[W]ho was the unpleasant person that took this deposition'...
"At the hearing before the Magistrate, will you continue to unleash a torrent of nasty
names and vituperative accusations as you continue to do in the written comments with
which you have interlard (sic) the file in this case with ad hominem until hell won't have
it?" ...
"[W]hy don't you take your own deposition, counsel."
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women who engage in Rambo tactics themselves,5 more women seem
to fear being the victims of Rambo behavior. Inexperienced women
attorneys are more likely to request suggestions in how to control the
Rambos of the deposition room than their male counterparts. When
questioned, these women often acknowledge that they have already
encountered a bully who tried to take advantage of them at a deposi-
tion. 2
Rambo lawyers do not limit their attacks on their opponents to those
who lack litigation experience. They have threatened opposing counsel
with physical violence, denigrated their opponent's religious background,
used gutter language in addressing their opponents, and accused opposing
counsel of having mental problems.53 They seem to know no limit in
doing whatever they perceive will give them an advantage in the
deposition room. Sometimes they attack using rudeness, profanity, and
even physical gestures. 4 At other times, they hide behind a misapplica-
tion of the rules, directing witnesses not to answer questions even though
an answer is clearly required, interrupting answers to stop the flow of
information, and improperly clarifying questions or coaching the witness
through speaking objections.55
One of the unfortunate consequences of these tactics is the creation
of a revenge motive in the opponent. After a strenuous round of attacks,
"[I]f you don't know how to produce evidence and ask a witness questions about
something that is admissible form, either for impeachment or for some other purpose,
then you can't blame Kawasaki for stonewalling to cover up your own inadequacies."...
"Your (sic) not any more skillful in asking the question than the other lawyer was in
asking the question." (He was speaking with reference to Halls deposition in another
lawsuit.)
Stengel, 116 F.R.D. at 267-68.
51. See Guerrero v. Board of Educ., No. C92-2971, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, at *33-43
(N.D. Cal. July 5, 1994) (order imposing disciplinary action), rev'don other grounds, No. 94-16415,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34992 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1995).
52. This conclusion is based on conversations with dozens of attorneys who have attended
continuing legal education deposition programs sponsored by the National Institute for Trial
Advocacy ("NITA") in New York; Washington, D.C.; Dallas; Chicago; Atlanta; Denver, Cleveland;
and Fort Lauderdale.
According to Professor Andrew Schepard, "[i]t is the young women attorneys who are
particularly worried about how to handle these Rambos. We have tried to respond to their requests
for training by devoting an entire afternoon of our program to a workshop on how to control
obstreperous opposing counsel during a deposition." Telephone Interview with Andrew Schepard,
Director, Northeast Deposition Program, jointly sponsored by NITA and Hofstra University (Aug.
30, 1995).
53. See infra Appendix for a summary of relevant cases.
54. See supra Part II.
55. See infra Part IV.B.
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the ethical lawyer, who has had to endure hours of abuse, may stoop to
the same behavior. It is easy to understand his or her decision. He is
angry. He has not been able to obtain properly discoverable information
from the deponent because the opposing Rambo lawyer has inappropri-
ately instructed his client not to answer. If the ethical lawyer is billing
by the hour, he knows he will have to justify his bill to the client; and
if he has charged his client a flat retainer, he may be losing money as the
deposition drags on without the transfer of information. Within the
confines of the deposition room, the Rambo tactics seem to be working;
access to information has been blocked and the opposing lawyer is
angry.5
6
It is at this point that some lawyers begin firing back with their own
invectives. William Schwarzer noted that "[1]awyers sometimes adopt
abusive tactics in the hope of exhausting and discouraging an opponent
or perhaps in self-defense against the abuse raining down on them."57
Justice Eugene A. Cook of the Supreme Court of Texas described how
the verbal abuse breeds more abuse, in stating that "[a] Rambo attitude
only evokes retaliation from other lawyers, making the problem even
worse."
58
Without a judge present to control the behavior of the initiating
lawyer, the ethical lawyer may perceive the Rambo tactics as actually
working and that no sanctions will result. 9 It is this cynicism that
fosters the behavior that is so harmful to the lawyers involved.
C. Parties
In addition to harming the judiciary and the lawyers, the John
Rambos of the deposition room also harm the parties. The incivility of
one lawyer to another lawyer costs both money and time to all con-
cerned.
If the attorney is charging the party by the hour, then the parties are
paying for the additional time it takes the attorneys to resolve disputes
56. See Cook, Practice of Law, supra note 47, at 973 (describing hardball litigators who, "in
a series of depositions that stretched out over 15 days, asked the opposing attorney to define 'when,'
'where,' 'own,' and 'describe"').
57. William W. Schwarzer, Mistakes Lawyers Make in Discovery, LITIG., Winter 1989, at 31,
32 (1989).
58. Cook, Practice of Law, supra note 47, at 971.
59. See Byron C. Keeling, A Prescription for Healing the Crisis in Professionalism: Shifling
the Burden ofEnforcing Professional Standards of Conduct, 25 TEx. TECH L. REv. 31,36-37 (1993)
(explaining that hardball litigation tactics often compel opposing attorneys to give up the fight and
initiate settlement negotiations).
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at the deposition. In addition, the party is usually paying for the extra
transcript pages needed to cover the arguments and name-calling among
counsel.
If the arguments cannot be resolved at the deposition, then the
parties may pay attorney's fees for the court time required for motions
to compel or motions for sanctions. If the court decides to enter
sanctions, the parties may risk the imposition of costs or even the
dismissal of their claims when sanctions are awarded against their
attorneys.6" Parties may also incur the costs of discovery masters to
supervise future depositions" and may have to pay for the retaking of
depositions if the court orders a second deposition.
62
The parties who are deposed may find that they are also paying for
their attorney's Rambo tactics with the loss of their own time. The
defending attorney who has been a victim of Rambo tactics may stoop
to using the same tactics when he deposes the other side.63 These
litigants may discover that they are spending many hours watching
useless squabbles between counsel at depositions.
The parties who become victims of this practice may well settle to
avoid the needless cost and energy of fighting the opposing attorney.
Byron Keeling described this settlement process as follows:
Hardball litigators gamble that groundless motions and abusive
discovery tactics will compel their opponents to give up the fight. More
often than not, the gamble works. Procedural tactics shackle opposing
counsel with reams of paperwork, producing exorbitant litigation costs.
Further, procedural tactics shackle the trial court with rounds of satellite
litigation, causing huge delays and driving litigation costs even higher.
Faced with these obstacles, even the most deserving opponents are
constrained to initiate settlement negotiations. To paraphrase an old
60. In Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 938 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1991), the
Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff's case with prejudice after he followed his
attorney's instructions at two different depositions and refused to answer questions posed to him. See
id. at 780. After the first deposition the lower court assessed fees and expenses of $6,317.66 to be
borne equally by the plaintiff and his counsel for counsel's "deliberate frustration of defendants'
discovery attempts." Id. at 779; see also Hinlde v. Sam Blanken & Co., 507 A.2d 1046, 1049-50
(D.C. 1986) (affirming grant ofdefault judgment against appellants for their willful "non-compliance
with discovery requests").
61. See Van Pilsum v. Iowa State Univ. of Science & Tech., 152 F.R.D. 179, 181 (S.D. Iowa
1993) (order imposing sanctions and granting protective order).
62. See Kelvey v. Coughlin, 625 A.2d 775, 776-77 (R.I. 1993).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
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maxim, "justice delayed, and justice obtained at excessive cost, is often
justice denied."64
Finally, in addition to the financial costs and the loss of time,
litigants may find that these tactics exact an emotional toll on them. They
are subpoenaed to attend depositions in which the attorneys engage in
rude name-calling, foul language, and even in some cases, threats of
physical violence. They cannot leave the deposition or escape the abusive
tactics. Even if they are not participants, they are compelled to watch the
warfare between the lawyers.
D. The Public
The John Rambos of the deposition room harm the public's
perception of the legal profession. Former Chief Justice Warren Burger,
in a recent lecture delivered at Fordham University, expressed concern
about a serious decline in professionalism among attorneys.6 5 Some
commentators have blamed the Rambo litigators for tainting the heritage
of the profession and wringing the enjoyment and pleasure from the
practice of law.'
Justice Cook recently described the public's view of the legal
profession:
The public's view of lawyers is at a critically low level. In a
study conducted by the ABA Committee on Professionalism, only 6%
of the corporate users of legal services rated "all or most" lawyers as
deserving to be called professionals. Only 7% of survey respondents
saw professionalism increasing among lawyers, while 68% said it had
decreased over time.67
Rambos feed the public's negative perception that lawyers are out for
their own gain and will do anything to win, including ad hominem
attacks on other attorneys and witnesses during depositions. Since there
is no judge present at the deposition to exercise immediate control over
the Rambo lawyers, deponents leave these depositions with the percep-
tion that whoever has the toughest lawyer and enough resources to wear
the other side down will carry the day.68 The deponent, and any friends
64. Keeling, supra note 59, at 36-37 (footnotes omitted).
65. See Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV. 949 (1995).
66. See Cook et al., Mandate for Professionalism, supra note 47, at 674.
67. Cook, Practice of Law, supra note 47, at 967 (footnote omitted).
68. "[1]n a market in which the client seeks a champion not a chaperon, a reputation for
aggressiveness may well be worth the costs in sanctions necessary to earn it." Ronald J. Gilson, The
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and family with whom he has shared the story, may never learn that the
legal system has sought to control its own members, even if judicial
sanctions are eventually imposed on the offending lawyer.
Pointed criticism of Rambos has expanded beyond legal publications
to the lay press. For instance, The Washington Post recently published
an article describing Rambo tactics in a deposition:
Depositions are supposed to be the law at its most courtly-
meetings held before a trial and outside the presence of a judge, where
lawyers try to elicit information from witnesses in a dignified manner.
But critics say depositions increasingly have become the occasion for
Rambo-like tactics, with lawyers vying to verbally bludgeon witnesses
and intimidate opposing counsel.69
When the non-legal press criticizes Rambo tactics, it is clear that the
general public is informed and concerned about the conduct.
Rambo lawyers claim that their obligation to zealously advocate for
their clients justifies their behavior.70 They charge that efforts to impose
civility and professionalism are "nothing more than an attempt by the
aristocracy of the bar-the good old boys-to preserve their own
status."'" They are wrong. The public and the bar are fed up with their
behavior.
IV. EXISTING REMEDIES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN DETERRING
INCIVILITY IN DEPOSITIONS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") already
provides remedies to control most Rambo behavior in depositions.72
Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 909 (1990);
see also Interim Report, supra note 47, at 393 (stating that perceived "client pressures for results are
important negative factors" contributing to incivility).
69. Weiser, supra note 7, at B10.
70. One commentator has stated:
The duty of zealousness was expressed in Canon 7, ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and its predecessor. The Model Rules do not expressly impose an
obligation of zealousness. The old standard has been abandoned in favor of the
commentary to Model Rule 1.1:
6. "Having accepted employment, a lawyer should act with competence,
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf."
W. Ted Minick, F'ng the Truth, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: LENDER LIABILITY AND
OTHER COiPLEX LITIGATION INVOLVING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 509, 513-14 n.10 (1994).
71. Id. at 513.
72. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11, 16, 26, 30, 37; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (imposing costs
on attorneys who multiply "the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously"). Rule 11 also
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States that have adopted rules of procedure based on the federal system
have the same remedies available in their state courts. 3 Therefore, the
problem is not the lack of rules or guidelines to control the behavior,74
but the perception in the practicing bar that the available sanctions will
not work, or are too expensive and cumbersome to utilize.
As stated above, in many federal courts, and in those states that
have adopted rules containing language similar to the Federal Rules,
litigants who encounter problems in depositions can seek judicial
assistance under several different rules. However, federal court practitio-
ners should be cautious in assuming the universal availability of these
remedies. Some of the remedies that are available in certain federal
districts may not be available in other districts due to the adoption of
local rules and the provisions of the 1993 Amendments to the Federal
Rules ("1993 Amendments") that permit districts to "opt out" of certain
provisions of the Federal Rules.75
provides the potential for sanctions for improper conduct of attorneys, but does not directly address
behavior during depositions. Rather, the Federal Rules is concerned with behavior and represen-
tations made to the courts and, therefore, will not be specifically addressed in this Article. However,
the incivility represented by Rambo lawyers often extends throughout all dealings in a case, and
lawyers who receive sanctions under Federal Rules 16, 26, 30, 37, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for their
behavior during discovery, including depositions, are often the same lawyers whose conduct
eventually leads to Rule 11 sanctions. Many times a court will find itself faced with imposing
sanctions under several of these provisions upon the same lawyer whose behavior remains inappro-
priate at various stages of a dispute. See, e.g., Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co., 76 F.3d 1538, 1552-57
(10th Cir. 1996) (upholding sanctions order pursuant to Rules 16 and 37); Blue v. United States
Dept. of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 537-40 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding sanctions order pursuant to Rules
11, 16, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Record Data, Inc. v. Schoolcraft, No. 83-C9537, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 219, *12-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1989) (imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927).
73. See Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical,
Comparative Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 315-16 & nn.8-9 (1992).
74. Several bar associations have adopted civility rules. See Proposed Standards for
Professional Conduct Within the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, reprinted in Final Report of the
Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441 app. A (1992)
[hereinafter Proposed Standards]; Guidelines for Conduct of the Section of Litigation of the A.B.A.,
LMG. NEWS, Dec.-Jan. 1996, at 6. The American Bar Associaiton ("A.B.A.") Standing Committee
on Professionalism recommended, and the A.B.A. approved, the following statement:
"The ... Guidelines are designed to encourage us, judges and lawyers, to meet our obligations to
each other, to litigants and to the system of justice, and thereby achieve the twin goals of civility
and professionalism, both of which are hallmarks of a learned profession dedicated to public
service." Id.
75. In 1988, Congress enacted procedures for the promulgation of local rules in each federal
district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (1994). Many district courts did adopt local rules, including
rules governing civil discovery. Then, in 1990, Congress adopted the Civil Justice Reform Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994), which mandated the adoption of a plan in each federal district to reduce
cost and delay in civil litigation. Many of the plans contemplate local rules placing limits on the
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A. Limitations on the Number and Length of Depositions
Anecdotal information from several surveys concerning civility in
the bar confirms that unlimited and lengthy depositions aggravate busy
attorneys and increase the likelihood of rude and unprofessional behavior
among attorneys. 76 The 1993 Amendments provide courts with the
amount of discovery that each side can conduct. Finally, in 1993, Congress adopted the Amendments
to the Federal Rules. See AMNDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401
(1993). Included in these amendments is a provision that districts may choose to "opt out" of certain
provisions of the Federal Rules, including the rules regarding discovery and depositions. See FED.
R. Ctv. P. 26(a)(1), (b)(2). These changes have resulted in confusion about which rules apply in
which district. Carl Tobias has referred to this era as the "Balkanization of Federal Procedure." Carl
Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARJZ. ST. L.J.
1393 (1992-93).
76. Comments from lawyers about the difficulties of taking depositions, derived from Interim
Report, supra note 47, include the following:
Abusive and unethical conduct re: coaching of witnesses during deposition
question and answer.
Attorneys are frequently unnecessarily hostile towards their opponents,
particularly in depositions.
Deliberate stall tactics forcing motions to compel; objections at depositions on
grounds other than form; counsel testifying for witnesses at depositions; lengthy
arguments over inane matters at depositions.
Refusing to cooperate in scheduling depositions, refusing to comply with the
rules, pushing the other side to move to compel before giving in.
Failure to respond properly to discovery. Improper conduct at deposi-
tions-advising witnesses not to answer questions; harassing questions.
Id. at 388.
Comments from lawyers with respect to the service of overly burdensome or intentionally
harassing discovery, in response to a survey, were gathered and distributed informally through the
North Carolina Bar Association and through publication in the State Bar Quarterly in 1993. See
Lawyers' Views of Professionalism and Civility in North Carolina (Greensboro Bar Ass'n Found.,
ed., Feb. 29, 1996) (CLE program, on file with the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter Greensboro
Lawyers' Views]. A total of 644 responses were received. Some comments were as follows:
[.] My perception is that some attorneys abuse the discovery process and raise frivolous
legal arguments as a basis to increase fees. This is creating an unfavorable public image
of our profession which I hope and believe is unwarranted.
[2.] By lawyers with a by the hour case resulting in protracted, useless litigation....
[3.] Lots of it unnecessary-except to build a file....
[4.] Increase the cost of proceedings [and] chill the process of negotiations.
[5.] It is unnecessary [and] sent only to allow more billable hours for defense firms.
[6.] These tactics delay resolution of disputes, increase client costs [and] promote public
dissatisfaction with the legal profession.
Id. (Vignettes) at 14.
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authority to limit both the number and length of depositions." Although
these limits may not eliminate the rude and unprofessional behavior, they
may reduce the opportunity for it.
Attorneys who anticipate problems with lengthy and burdensome
depositions in a specific case may now make motions under Rules
26(b)(2) and 30(a)(2) for an order limiting the number and length of
depositions,78 or they may request a limit on the number of depositions
at a pretrial conference under Rule 16." Finally, in some federal
jurisdictions, attorneys do not need a case-specific court order because
the federal court has adopted local rules that limit both the number and
the length of depositions in all cases tried in that jurisdiction.80
B. Definitions of Appropriate Objections and Instructions
Not to Answer
Prior to the 1993 Amendments, the Federal Rules did not specifical-
ly define appropriate objections in a deposition or appropriate grounds
for instructing a witness not to answer a question. Attorneys often locked
horns at the deposition on the merits of objections that were thinly veiled
attempts to coach a witness or instructions not to answer that were
stonewalling tactics.8' Because there was no judge present at the
77. Rule 30(a)(2)(A) now provides that a party must obtain leave of court if a proposed
deposition would result in more than ten depositions by the plaintiffs, defendants, or third-party
defendants. Rule 30(a)(2)(B) now provides that a party must obtain leave of court before deposing
a person who has already been deposed in the case. Rule 26(b)(2) now provides that a court may
alter the number of depositions to be taken in a case and may also limit the length of those
depositions under Rule 30.
78. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c), 30(d).
79. See id. 16(c)(6).
80. See Cascella v. GDV, Inc., No. CIV.A.5899, 1981 WL 15129, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 15,
1981); In re Asbestos Litigation, 492 A.2d 256, 257-58 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985); see also U.S. DIST.
CT. M.D.N.C. R. 204 (providing a presumptive limit of seven depositions for the plaintiffs,
defendants, and third-party defendants unless the case is classified as "exceptional," in which case
the presumptive limit is raised to ten depositions for the plaintiffs, defendants, and third-party
defendants).
81. The Advisory Committee's Notes to the Federal Rules provide:
Depositions frequently have been unduly prolonged, if not unfairly frustrated, by lengthy
objections and colloquy, often suggesting how the deponent should respond. While
objections may, under the revised rule, be made during a deposition, they ordinarily
should be limited to those that under Rule 32(d)(3) might be waived if not made at that
time, Le., objections on grounds that might be immediately obviated, removed, or cured,
such as to the form of a question or the responsiveness of an answer ...
Directions to a deponent not to answer a question can be even more disruptive
than objections.
FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments).
[Vol. 25:561
HeinOnline  -- 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 582 1996-1997
RAMBO DEPOSITIONS
deposition to make an immediate ruling on either the objection or the
instruction not to answer, counsel often resorted to lengthy arguments
about whether a deponent had to respond to a particular question.82
The 1993 Amendment to Rule 30(d)(1) added a provision dealing
with this behavior at depositions:
Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated
concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner. A
party may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to
preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the
court, or to present a motion under paragraph (3).83
According to the Advisory Committee's Notes, these changes were made
to prevent lengthy objections and colloquy suggesting how the deponent
should respond to a question.84 The drafters also hoped that the amend-
ments would reduce the number of disruptions to the deposition caused
by instructions to the deponent not to answer a question.85
82. See Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 115 F.R.D. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (order imposing
sanction on plaintiffs' counsel). In Unique Concepts, the federal district court found that it was "hard
to find a page [of the deposition transcript] on which [defending counsel did] not intrude on the
examination with a speech, a question to the examiner, or an attempt to engage in colloquy
distracting to the examiner." Id. In a motion for sanctions, the examining attorney calculated "that
of the 147 pages of the ... deposition transcript, [the defending attorney] appear[ed] on 132
pages ... with statements other than an objection to the form of the question." Id. at 293; see also
Van Pilsum v. Iowa State Univ. of Science & Tech., 152 F.R.D. 179, 180 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (order
imposing sanctions and granting protective order). The court held:
From a review of the transcript of the deposition, it appears [the plaintiff] ha[d]
no difficulties understanding or communicating in the English language. However, her
counsel, Mr. Barrett repeatedly took it upon himself to restate Defendants' counsel's
questions in order to "clarify" them for the Plaintiff. Mr. Barrett consistently interrupted
Mr. Young and the witness, interposing "objections" which were thinly veiled instructions
to the witness, who would then incorporate Mr. Barrett's language into her answer.
Id. at 180.
The court then stated that the plaintiff's counsel engaged in
ad hominem attacks on Mr. Young's ethics, litigation experience, and honesty .... In
fact, of the 4025 lines of transcript, only seventy percent contain questions by Mr. Young
and answers by Ms. Van Pilsum. The balance is discussion, argument, bickering,
haranguing, and general interference by Mr. Barrett (818 lines) and response by Mr.
Young (340 lines).
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1).
84. See supra note 81.
85. The Advisory Committee's Notes to the Federal Rules provide:
Directions to a deponent not to answer a question can be even more disruptive
than objections. The second sentence of new paragraph (1) [of Rule 30(d)] prohibits such
directions except in the three circumstances indicated: to claim a privilege or protection
against disclosure . . ., to enforce a court directive limiting the scope or length of
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Although the mere enactment of these rules will not stop the rude
arguments between counsel over objections and instructions not to
answer, the 1993 Amendments should make it more difficult for
obstreperous lawyers to defend their conduct at hearings on motions to
compel the answers to questions they and their clients avoided at the
deposition. Judges now have a standard against which to measure the
objections and the instructions not to answer.
C. Protective Orders
Tempers explode and defending attorneys resort to playground
tactics of bullying and throwing out personal insults when they are
frustrated by an opponent's continued pursuit of a line of questioning that
they feel is irrelevant or potentially privileged. The defending attorney
may decide that it is his job to protect the deponent from an area of
inquiry at any cost. The examining attorney, on the other hand, often
concludes (perhaps correctly) that the deponent must be hiding important
information for the defending attorney to get so obstreperous in his
client's defense. Because no judge is present to make an immediate
ruling, each attorney resorts to Rambo tactics to win control of the
deposition room.
The Federal Rules provide defending attorneys with methods to
protect their witnesses without resorting to these tactics. When a
deponent's attorney is concerned that the examining attorney may inquire
into areas that are privileged, or may attempt to embarrass, humiliate, or
badger the witness, the deponent's attorney may seek a protective order
under Rules 30(d)(3) or 26(c). 6 Even if the defending attorney does not
get a protective order prior to the deposition, he may adjourn the
deposition to seek a protective order if the inquiry proceeds into
permissible discovery, or to suspend a deposition to enable presentation of a motion
under paragraph (3).
FED. R. CIv. P. 30 advisory committee's note (1993 Amendments).
86. Rule 30(d)(3) of the Federal Rules provides:
At any time during a deposition, on motion of a party or of the deponent and
upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner
as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court in which
the action is pending or the court in the district where the deposition is being taken may
order the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the
deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided
in Rule 26(c).
Id. 30(d)(3); see also id. 26(c) (outlining the procedure to get a motion for a protective order to limit
discovery).
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privileged, embarrassing, or humiliating areas.87 Although protective
orders do not prevent rude behavior between counsel, they do delineate
areas of inquiry which are off limits during the deposition, thereby
obviating the need for counsel to argue about the appropriateness of any
particular line of inquiry at the deposition.
The entry of a protective order rightfully permits the defending
attorney to instruct a witness not to answer a question that inquires into
an area covered by the protective order.8 Attorneys who anticipate that
their opponent will engage in a fishing expedition may seek a judicial
ruling prior to the deposition, defining the appropriate topics for
questioning at the deposition. 9
Although protective orders are a possible solution to burdensome
lines of inquiry at depositions, not all courts are responsive to the request
for a protective order. Judges are sometimes loathe to enter an order
eliminating a line of questioning when they do not know all the issues
in the case. For instance, in Sczesnik v. McDonald' Corp.," the
plaintiff's counsel sought a protective order, limiting the areas of
interrogation, after two days of deposing the plaintiff. The underlying
case involved employment discrimination based on gender, breach of
employment contract, and tortious interference with the employment
relationship between the plaintiff and her employer.91 The court refused
to enter a protective order even though it documented the abusive
questions the defense counsel had used during the previous two days of
deposition.92 The court concluded that it would be difficult for it to
determine relevant areas of inquiry. However, it did impose a limit of a
single day of not more than five hours to conclude the deposition, noting
87. See id. 30(d)(3).
88. See id. 26(c)(4).
89. See id.
90. 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 36,490 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
91. See id.
92. The court noted:
1. Defendant's counsel repeatedly belabored points of miniscule relevance, e.g.,
plaintiff's daughters' marital history; who cooked in plaintiff's home; the installation of
a washer and dryer.
2. Defendant's counsel repeatedly argued with the deponents by characterizing
previous testimony as "lies", "lying", "I think you lied".
3. Defendant's counsel repeatedly used sarcasm, e.g., "Oh, really", "Was this a
negligent lie?"
4. Defendant's counsel repeatedly badgered the witnesses.
5. Defendant's counsel repeatedly displayed a lack of civility to plaintiff's
counsel.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the "[d]efendant's counsel [would], therefore, by necessity have to
confine himself to relevant questions and avoid disruptive behavior."'9 3
D. Pretrial Orders, Standing Orders, and Local Rules
Under Rules 16 and 26(f) of the Federal Rules, attorneys may now
seek pretrial orders that limit abusive discovery tactics during deposi-
tions.94 Some judges are now routinely imposing restrictions on
deposition practices in all their pretrial orders," while others are
entering case-specific pretrial orders that include limitations on behavior
in depositions.96 For instance, in In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litigation, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico ordered that only objections concerning privileged matters and those
matters that. could be corrected immediately (i.e., the form of the
question) could be raised during the deposition.97 The court also
prohibited coaching or argumentative interruptions during any deposi-
tions.98 In Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,9 9 the United States Magis-
93. Id.
94. "At any conference under this rule consideration may be given, and the court may take
appropriate action, with respect to... the control and scheduling of discovery, including orders
affecting disclosures and discovery ..... FED, R. Civ. P. 16(c).
Rule 26(f) provides:
Except in actions exempted by local rule or when otherwise ordered, the parties
shall ... meet to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the
possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case.... make or arrange for
the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1), and... develop a discovery plan. The plan
shall indicate the parties' views and proposals concerning:
(2) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be
completed, and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or
focused upon particular issues;
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under
these rules or by local rule, and what other limitations should be imposed; and
(4) any other orders that should be entered by the court... under Rule 16(b) and
Cc).
Id. 26(f).
95. See In re All Pending and Future Litig. Before the Honorable G. Ross Anderson, Jr.,
No.6:93m161 (D.S.C. Dec. 16, 1993) (order establishing guidelines on taking of depositions in
matters before the court); Hall v. Clifon Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (order
concerning conduct during depositions).
96. See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No.1:90-CV-2485-MHS, MDL 861, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20095, at *19-28 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (order setting forth deposition guidelines for
the parties); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17332, at *107-
11 (D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1988) (order requiring specific conduct during depositions).
97. See 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17332, at *107.
98. See id.
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trate was so frustrated with counsel's inability or unwillingness to
comply with informal procedures for resolution of discovery disputes that
she ordered that instructions not to answer a deposition question could
only be given on grounds of privilege; l"' and ordered that any disputes
arising at the deposition be submitted to her by telephone conference
with the court reporter recording the telephone call.0 '
Although these blanket pretrial orders may restrict Rambo behavior,
they may also restrict effective and necessary representation of clients at
a deposition. For example, when a court prohibits all objections except
as to the form of the question and matters of privilege, attorneys who
need to explain an objection cannot do so. If an individual and a
corporation have both been sued, the attorney representing the individual
may want to object to the question, "When did you first learn of the
discriminating act?" in order to clarify whether the question refers to the
individual or the corporation. However, under the wording of the blanket
pretrial order, his or her only option is to say, "Objection, vague." The
opposing attorney and the deponent may not understand the problem with
the question. Needless time will be wasted by all concerned, pursuing a
line of questions about which the client may have no knowledge, when
a simple explanation by the defending attorney would have clarified the
situation.
Similarly, when judges enter blanket orders prohibiting all
consultations between clients and their defending attorneys once a
deposition has begun,102 they may stop the coaching of witnesses, an
occurrence that often leads to frayed tempers among the attorneys. 103
The judges, however, may also stop any necessary consultation between
the attorney and his or her client concerning whether a mistake has been
made or fraudulent testimony has been given.'0
4
99. No. 91 CIV.0035 (KMW), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15785 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1991) (order
compelling document production and depositions).
100. See id. at *20.
101. See id. at *20-21.
102. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wayne Manor Apartments, 152 F.R.D. 56, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (order
directing submission to depositions and payment of sanctions); Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D.
525, 531-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (order concerning conduct during depositions).
103. See Guerrero v. Board of Educ., No. C92-2971, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, at *14-21
(N.D. Cal. July 5, 1994) (order imposing disciplinary action), rev'd on other grounds, No. 94-16415,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34992 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1995); American Directory Serv. Agency, Inc. v.
Beam, 131 F.R.D. 15, 18-19 & n.6 (D.D.C. 1990) (order imposing sanctions); In re Williams, 414
N.W.2d 394, 397-98 (Minn. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam), appeal dismissed sub nom. Williams v.
Lawyers Prof l Responsibility Bd., 485 U.S. 950 (1988).
104. See Taylor, supra note 46, at 1068.
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E. Sanctions
In the last decade, courts have sanctioned Rambo lawyers for their
verbal attacks on clients, deponents, and other attorneys during deposi-
tions. The courts justified their sanctions under the Federal Rules, 28
U.S.C. § 1927, and their inherent judicial power to govern the practices
of the attorneys appearing before them. The rules are in place to protect
the victims of this Rambo behavior, and the courts are enforcing the
rules.
1. Rule 30
The drafters of Rule 30 anticipated the need to protect deponents
and parties from the Rambo behavior of deposing attorneys. If an
examining attorney conducts a deposition "in bad faith or in such manner
as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party"
the defending attorney may seek a court order to stop or limit the scope
and manner of the deposition. 5 If the court grants relief, the deponent
or party may also seek an award of expenses incurred in relation to the
motion."' Thus, Rule 30 protects the deponent or party who has been
a victim of Rambo behavior.
2. Rule 37
The drafters of the Federal Rules also anticipated the need for
protecting a party and his attorney from Rambo attorneys who improper-
ly instruct their clients not to answer questions at a deposition. If a
witness chooses to follow his attorney's instructions to stonewall when
he is asked a proper question at a deposition, he runs the risk of having
sanctions entered against him under Rule 37.'07 In addition to the
105. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(3).
106. See id.
107. Rule 37(a)(2)(B) provides:
If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rules 30
or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or
31(a). ... the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer .... The
motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make the discovery in an effort to
secure the information or material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral
examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination
before applying for an order.
Id. 37(a)(2)(B).
Rule 37(a)(3) provides: "For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete
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enumerated sanctions of Rule 37, the court may also order the retaking
of the deposition, thereby inconveniencing the witness and costing the
client additional money.10 8
In Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,109 the
plaintiff, a doctor who refused to renew his insurance to the limits
required by the hospital, followed his attorney's instructions and refused
to answer basic questions about damages and the allegations of the
complaint.10 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's assess-
ment of fees and expenses in the amount of $6,317.66 against the doctor
disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond." Id.
37(a)(3).
Rule 37(a)(4)(A) provides:
If the motion is granted or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided
after the motion was filed, the court shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard,
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or
attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable
expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees ....
Id. 37(a)(4)(A).
Rule 37(b)(2) provides:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule
or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court in
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order,
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating
as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to a
physical or mental examination;
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or both to
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the
court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
Id. 37(b)(2).
108. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wayne Manor Apartments, 152 F.R.D. 56, 59-60 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(order directing submission to depositions and payment of sanctions).
109. 938 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1991).
110. See id. at 778.
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and his counsel, with payment to be equally divided between them.11'
At the rescheduled deposition, the plaintiff again followed his counsel's
instructions not to answer certain questions, even though the district court
had already approved the questions. When the case again came before the
district court on a motion asking for sanctions, the court, relying on Rule
37(b) dismissed the doctor's case with prejudice."' Fees and costs of
$5,085.50 were also awarded to the defendants."' The Seventh Circuit
affirmed, stating that "[t]he doctor and his counsel fully deserve the
sanctions imposed and leave no alternative but to affirm the district court
in all respects.1 .14
Not all clients participate in the Rambo tactics employed by their
counsel to the extent undertaken by the physician described above. In
situations where the client may merely be following the advice of
counsel not to answer a question, the courts have sanctioned the attorney
personally, but not the client.115 For instance, in Van Pilsum v. Iowa
State University of Science & Technology,116 the district court sanc-
tioned the plaintiff's attorney for his repeated objections and "ad
hominem attacks on [the opposing attorney's] ethics, litigation experi-
ence, and honesty.'' . The court then noted that "[i]n the course of the
167 page deposition, there [were] only four segments where five or more
pages occurred without an interruption from [plaintiff's attorney].""' 8
The district court condemned the plaintiff's attorney's "Rambo Litiga-
tion" style "which may prove effective out of the presence of the court,
and may be impressive to clients as well as ego-gratifying to those who
practice it.""' 9 The court then stated that it would not tolerate the
behavior and, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4), ordered the plaintiff's counsel
to personally pay half the cost of the deposition, but the plaintiff was not
punished by the court. 20 The court further ordered that future deposi-
tions be conducted in the presence of a discovery master.
12
'
111. See id. at 779.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 780.
114. Id.
115. See Brignoli v. Balch, Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 126 F.R.D. 462,466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(order imposing sanctions).
116. 152 F.RP.D. 179 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (order imposing sanctions and granting protective order).
117. Id. at 180.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 181.
120. See id.
121. See id.
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3. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
In addition to the relief provided by the Federal Rules, federal
statutes also provide remedies against unruly attorneys who abuse the
deposition process. Several courts have imposed monetary sanctions
against attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 when an attorney's intentional
actions during depositions have unnecessarily prolonged the discovery
process." The statute provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.lu
In Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 24 the Southern District of
New York imposed sanctions pursuant to § 1927 against the plaintiff's
counsel, Samuel J. Rosen, for his "abusive, disruptive, unreasonable, and
dilatory behavior during" the deposition of the plaintiff.121 The defen-
dant calculated "that of the 147 pages of the . . . deposition transcript,
Rosen appears on 132 pages (91%) with statements other than an
objection to the form of the question."'26 The court concluded that
Rosen's misconduct was in bad faith and rose to the level appropriate for
sanctions. 1"' First, the court ordered a reexamination of the plaintiff and
then ordered Rosen, "personally and without reimbursement from his
client," to pay $693.25 to the defendant for the transcript cost of the
useless deposition, as well as a fine of $250 to be paid "to the Clerk of
the Court for contentious, abusive, obstructive, scurrilous, and insulting
conduct in a Court ordered deposition. 12
Likewise, in American Directory Service Agency, Inc. v. Beam,129
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia imposed
122. See, e.g., American Directory Serv. Agency, Inc. v. Beam, 131 F.R.D. 15, 17-19 (D.D.C.
1990) (order imposing sanctions); Brignoli v. Balch, Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 126 F.R.D. 462,466
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (order imposing sanctions); Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 115 F.R.D. 292,293-
94 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (order imposing sanctions on plaintiffs' counsel).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994).
124. 115 F.R.D. at 292.
125. Unique Concepts, 115 F.R.D. at 292.
126. Id. at 293. See supra note 49 for a verbatim transcript of some of the adhominem attacks
made by Rosen.
127. See Unique Concepts, 115 F.R.D. at 294.
128. Id.
129. 131 F.R.D. 15 (D.D.C. 1990) (order imposing sanctions).
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personal sanctions under § 1927 against an attorney, Laurance J. Ochs,
whose conduct the court described as "nothing less than outrageous."'"3
The court found that the attorney "'coached' responses, and he frequently
instructed his clients not to answer at all. In addition, Ochs' repeated
objections, puerile arguments with opposing counsel, and vexatious
requests for clarification prevented the elicitation of any meaningful
testimony and needlessly added to the expense of th[e] litigation."'31
The court ordered Ochs to personally "pay to Beam the reasonable
expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred [by the] depositions and the
subsequent cross-motions for sanctions."
13
4. Courts' Inherent Judicial Power to Regulate Conduct
In addition to remedies provided under state rules, the Federal
Rules, and federal statutes, courts that are trying to control Rambo
behavior in depositions also rely on their inherent power to regulate the
conduct of those attorneys appearing before them. In 1985, the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed the power of a court to discipline
attorneys practicing before it in stating that "[c]ourts have long recog-
nized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers.' 33
One United States district court judge, Barbara A. Caulfield, found
that she had the inherent authority to sanction an attorney who committed
eight instances of unprofessional conduct at depositions. 34 Citing two
cases involving the discipline of attorneys for actions occurring during
depositions, Judge Caulfield held that "[c]ourts have imposed discipline
for a wide range of conduct, including offensive and threatening
speech.' ' 3 In one case cited by Judge Caulfield, a Colorado court
disciplined an "attorney for making uncomplimentary observations and
physical threats during [the] deposition and shoving deponent's wife after
[the] deposition. 136 In another case cited by Judge Caulfield, the
attorney, Mr. Levin, threatened during the deposition, "among other
things, to take his questioner's mustache off his face, to give [opposing
counsel] the beating of his life, to slap him across his face, and to break
130. Id. at 18.
131. Id. (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 19.
133. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985).
134. See Guerrero v. Board of Educ., No, C92-2971, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, at *33 (N.D.
Cal. July 5, 1994) (order imposing disciplinary action), rev'd on other grounds, No. 94-16415, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 34992 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1995).
135. Id. at *30.
136. Id. (citing People v. Genchi, 824 P.2d 815, 816 (Colo. 1992) (en bane)).
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his head." '137 The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the board's recommen-
dation that Mr. Levin be publicly reprimanded and indefinitely suspended
from the practice of law, with the cost of the proceeding to be taxed
against him.'38 Relying on her inherent authority to discipline the
attorney appearing before her, Judge Caulfield suspended the attorney
from practicing law before the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California in certain types of cases and required the
attorney to inform all clients of the order.'39
V. REMEDIES
The rules allowing courts to control Rambo behavior during
depositions are already in place. Instead of enacting more rules or
implementing local court orders to prevent all speaking objections and
consultations between deponents and their counsel, the bench, the bar,
and the law schools need to act on a case-by-case basis to control those
litigants who attempt to gain a tactical advantage through name-calling,
demeaning gestures, and personal threats.
A. Swift Justice
When a lawyer encounters trouble in a deposition, he needs
immediate access to judicial protection. The judiciary needs to arrange
for a "judge on call" system similar to the medical profession's
arrangement of emergency care for patients. In some judicial districts,
these services can be provided by magistrates, but in other areas, judges
would need to rotate the position. The "judge on call" would need to be
available for telephone hearings which could be transcribed by the court
reporter. The judge must be vested with the authority to make immediate
rulings on behavior at the deposition and on the appropriateness of a line
of questioning during the deposition. In addition, the judge on call would
need the authority to mandate the payment of costs for any attorney who
loses on a motion, as well as the power to impose further sanctions if the
behavior is particularly egregious.
Although this arrangement would be expensive and time-consuming
for an already overworked judiciary, the benefits would soon justify the
costs. Lawyers who face swift sanctions if they misbehave would modify
137. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 517 N.E.2d 892, 893 (Ohio 1988) (per curiam);
see Guerrero, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, at *30-31.
138. See Levin, 517 N.E.2d at 895.
139. See Guerrero, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, at *44.
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their behavior accordingly. In addition, fewer full court hearings would
be held on motions to compel and motions for sanctions because the
problems would have been resolved during the session with the "judge
on call."
Over the last decade many groups have recommended that trial
judges take a more active role in the conduct of litigation. In 1986, the
A.B.A. Commission on Professionalism ("Professionalism Commission")
recommended that "[t]he role of the judiciary in the conduct of litigation
should be strengthened and courts should play a more decisive role
earlier in the litigation process.""14 The Professionalism Commission
also encouraged judges to impose sanctions for abuse of the litigation
process, noting that the Federal Rules permit the imposition of sanctions
for such abuses. 41 Furthermore, the Professionalism Commission
cautioned against imposing sanctions on innocent clients when they are
not responsible for their lawyers' improper acts, and instead suggested
that in some cases the courts should report the misconduct to disciplinary
commissions.142
Congress also recognized a need for a more active judiciary; thus,
it enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act. 43 According to the legislative
history, one of the six cornerstone principles of the Act was "imposing
greater controls on the discovery process."'" Congress reported that
reform of the present system depended on "'the importance of courts
exercising early, active, and continuous control over case progress."' 14 s
In its 1992 report, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century,'46 the
A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement
("Disciplinary Commission") recommended that "[r]egulation of the legal
profession should remain under the authority of the judicial branch of
140. A.B.A. Comm'n on Professionalism, "... In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint
for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 290 (1986) [hereinafter Lawyer
Professionalism].
141. See id. at 265, 291-92.
142. See id. at 291.
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
144. S. REP. No. 101-416, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6817; see also
Matthew R. Kipp & Paul B. Lewis, Legislatively Directed Judicial Activism: Some Reflections on
the Meaning of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 305, 337 (1995) (noting the
importance of active judicial involvement in all aspects of case administration).
145. Kipp & Lewis, supra note 144, at 337 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-416, at 16).
146. A.B.A. CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW
CENTURY, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1992)
[hereinafter LAWYER REGULATION].
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government."' 47 The Disciplinary Commission expressed grave concern
that if the courts did not exercise control over the discipline of attorneys,
other groups may attempt to intervene and regulate the behavior.141
The "judge on call" proposal would enable courts to swiftly
intervene on a case-by-case basis. Its adoption would eliminate the need
for blanket rules or standing orders that prohibit all speaking objections
or all consultations between the defending attorney and his witness once
the deposition has begun.'49
The judiciary has a strong responsibility to regulate the Rambo
behavior of attorneys, and the creation of a "judge on call" would
increase judicial involvement. However, the bar and the law schools
share this responsibility. One commentator has warned that if we place
the responsibility for correcting Rambo behavior solely on the judiciary
we will end up with "Terminator Judges" disciplining Rambo law-
yers.5 Therefore, the following proposed remedies focus on the
practicing bar and the law schools.
B. Lawyers Should Report Rambo Behavior to the Courts and Bar
Disciplinary Committees
Often lawyers are loathe to complain about the Rambo behavior
they have encountered in depositions. They may feel that complaining
will accomplish nothing, the remedy will be so delayed as to be useless,
the expense of a motion to compel will not be justified, or the behavior,
while bad, is not so bad.'
In fact, one of the most egregious examples of Rambo behavior
occurring during a deposition discussed in this Article was not reported
to a court, but was uncovered by a court, sua sponte.5 2 Judges should
not have to seek out examples of Rambo litigation in the deposition
transcripts filed with the court. Lawyers should report the Rambo
behavior when it occurs.
This suggestion does not mean that a lawyer should report every
147. Id. at 1.
148. See id. at 1-8.
149. See supra Part IV.D for a further discussion of these blanket orders.
150. See Robert E. Keeton, Times Are Changing for Trials in Court, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 15-17 (1993).
151. "The most unfortunate consequence of the procedural battles that hardball litigators wage
against their opponents is that, ultimately, they force the parties in litigation to sacrifice substantive
justice for procedural detail." Keeling, supra note 59, at 36.
152. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51-54 & n.23
(Del. 1994) (addendum to the opinion relating to the issue of professionalism in depositions).
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angry word uttered during the heat of battle. In an en banc decision, the
Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished between an intemperate
comment uttered in anger and the intentional racial slur that provoked the
comment.'53 The court issued a public reprimand for the racial slur and
rejected the respondent's equal protection argument. It stated that the
"[r]espondent overlook[ed] the lack of provocation for his own remarks
and the understandable provocation for opposing counsel's re-
sponse."'1 4
One commentator has recommended that victims of Rambo behavior
report the incident and make the Rambo lawyer pay for the bad
behavior. 5 She recommends that attorneys create a "Rambo file"
documenting every bit of aggravation that takes place during the course
of the litigation. 56 She then recommends that the file be used to
document Rambo lawyers' lack of professionalism:
Use it in fee hearings and, under your own local statutes and rules of
civil procedure, to impose sanctions and penalties for frivolous or
vexations [sic] litigation. In the next case where you must face off with
Rambo, arm yourself with your file and learn from it. Use all available
remedies to make Rambo pay for his/her dirty tricks until (s)he learns
his/her lessons.' 5
When Rambo behavior begins to cost money, then it will stop.
Lawyers must stop their passivity about Rambo depositions. Not
only should they report name-calling, demeaning gestures, and personal
threats occurring during depositions to judges and bar disciplinary
committees, but they should create an atmosphere in their firm where
young associates will feel comfortable to complain about their mistreat-
ment by opposing attorneys in depositions. If young associates feel
support from senior partners, they will not feel isolated and helpless.
They will also learn that the behavior they have encountered is wrong,
is not condoned by the firm, and should not be imitated.
153. See In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394 (Minn. 1987) (en bane) (per curiam), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Williams v. Lawyers Prof'l Responsibility Bd., 485 U.S. 950 (1988). See infra
Appendix for a transcript of the deposition.
154. Williams, 414 N.W.2d at 398.
155. See Elser, supra note 47, at 7.
156. See id.
157. Id.
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C. More Active Local Bar Associations
In 1988, the A.B.A. House of Delegates adopted The Lawyer's
Creed of Professionalism and recommended that state and local bars
adopt similar creeds. 5 ' In the past decade, many local bar associations
have enacted civility codes to counter Rambo behavior."l 9
Despite the enactment of these codes of conduct, Rambo behavior
continues. 60 Instead of the enactment of a written civility code, what
is needed is the reemergence of the unwritten, but universally accepted,
code of conduct adhered to by an earlier generation of lawyers. Byron C.
Keeling has described this earlier code of conduct:
The unwritten professional code of conduct encouraged mutual coopera-
tion, and indeed, it required lawyers to abjure nuisance suits and
tactical maneuvers that were inconsistent with this goal. Lawyers who
violated the code of conduct could expect two consequences: they
would lose their social standing with fellow members of the legal
profession, and, given the small size of the organized bar, they would
suffer appropriate retaliation in kind.' 6'
Although some may say that the size of the current bar 62 pre-
cludes a reemergence of this unwritten code of conduct, this Author
believes that the possibility exists for this code to once again become a
way of life for the practicing bar. Workshops and conferences can teach
and promote this unwritten code of civility.
158. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:401 (Aug. 31, 1988).
159. See Interim Report, supra note 47, at 422-23 (describing ethical codes in the following
bars: Akron (Ohio); Arizona; A.B.A. Tort and Insurance Practice Section; Dallas (Texas);
Hillsborough County (Florida); Houston (Texas); Kansas City (Missouri); Kentucky; Lafayette
County (Mississippi); Los Angeles County (California); Maine; Massachusetts; Memphis and Shelby
County (Tennessee); Mississippi; Montana; Multnomah (Oregon); Nashville (Tennessee); Nebraska;
North Carolina; Pulaski County (Arkansas); Shreveport (Louisiana); and Texas).
160. One commentator has recommended the enactment of a new model rule to control
mounting ad hominem attacks occurring throughout the legal process. Although the mandatory nature
of the rule she proposes might make a difference, and would certainly do no harm in the battle to
control this behavior, this Author believes that enforcement of the current rules and codes will be
more effective than the enactment of yet another rule that is ignored. For a thoughtful discussion of
this problem, see Lydia P. Arnold, Note, Ad Hominem Attacks: Possible Solutions for a Growing
Problem, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmCS 1075 (1995).
161. Keeling, supra note 59, at 32-33 (footnotes omitted).
162. The legal profession has grown from approximately 286,000 lawyers in 1960 to over
896,000 lawyers in 1995. See BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990'S, at 1
(1994).
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The size of many local bars precludes the possibility of an attorney
knowing every other attorney in town. However, with the creation of
small discussion groups at local bar conferences, attorneys can once
again create the collegiality of lunch at the local diner. In these small
discussion groups, attorneys can begin to share their experiences of
Rambo behavior. When the experience is no longer a "dirty little secret,"
but a shared horror, fruitful discussion of potential corrective behavior
can occur.
In North Carolina, during the last two years, four different local bar
associations hosted three-hour programs on civility in the legal profes-
sion. 63 In each program participants were divided into discussion
groups of twelve to twenty-five attorneys. To facilitate a discussion, each
group assigned roles and acted out five scripted vignettes illustrating
Rambo behavior. After the initial reticence common to all group
activities, many attorneys shared their experiences with Rambo behavior
and discussed ways in which the local bar could control its own
members. 64
Civility "codes will not create civility. Lawyers do not need more
codes, but instead an open and participatory discussion of the problem
so that the bar can once again regulate its own.
D. Professionalism Committees Should Be Established in Law Firms
to Monitor Activities of the Firm
Law firms need to establish committees within the firm in which
professionalism is discussed and monitored. Young attorneys need to
know they will be supported when they refuse to engage in Rambo
tactics. They need to know that senior partners and clients will not be
permitted to bully them into Rambo behavior.
163. See Lawyers' Views of Professionalism and Civility in North Carolina (Mecklenburg
County Bar ed., Nov. 4, 1994) (CLE program on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Lawyers' View
of Professionalism and Civility in North Carolina (Rowan/Cabarrus County Bar ed., Jan. 26, 1996)
(CLE program on file with the Hofstra Law Review); Greensboro Lawyers' Views, supra note 76.
164. See supra note 162.
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E. Continuing Legal Education Programs Should Train Lawyers in
How to Effectively Control a Rambo Opponent
Many Rambo tactics in a deposition can be effectively controlled
and minimized by a well-prepared attorney.165 Continuing legal educa-
tion classes on deposition-taking should include workshops on the control
of the Rambo lawyer.' 6
6
For instance, if the deposing attorney asks simply worded questions,
he avoids the numerous objections and legal wrangling that ensue over
the wording of complicated questions. The defending attorney has a
much harder time justifying his unnecessary objections if the questions
are clear and simple.167 The effective wording of questions is a skill
that can be taught and practiced in simulated depositions.
The deposing attorney can also be taught to ignore unnecessary
objections that are made to harass the attorney. If the deposing attorney
does not rise to the bait, but instead asks the question again and waits for
the witness to answer, the defending attorney will often stop the
harassment because it does not work.
168
If the deposing attorney knows in advance that the defending
attorney is particularly difficult, he can schedule the deposition at the
courthouse so that there is easy access to a judge or magistrate if
arguments arise during the deposition.'69 The deposing attorney can
also schedule the deposition for videotaping with the hope that the
defending attorney will avoid making his obstreperous comments on a
videotape that can be played before a judge. 70
165. "In fact, the freight-train roar of a confrontational lawyer at full throttle may often be the
equivalent of a 'smokescreen of strategic bluster' that camouflages the lawyer's own perplexity."
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 299, 314 (1990) (footnote omitted).
166. NITA continuing legal education workshops, which are held across the country and include
a workshop entitled "Taking and Defending Depositions," include at least a one-hour session on
effective ways to handle the obstreperous lawyer.
167. See MALONE & HOFPmAN, supra note 49, at 195. In this book, the authors recommend
various strategies for dealing with "obnoxious or obstructionist defending counser' when taking
depositions. Id. at 190-98. One of their recommendations is that attorneys ask good questions. "One
of the most effective ways to frustrate the opposing counsel who is waiting to pounce upon every
minor fla, in questioning is to ask good questions to begin with.' Id. at 195.
168. See id. at 193.
169. See Guerrero v. Board ofEduc., No. C92-2971, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, at *17-18
(N.D. Cal. July 5,1994) (order imposing disciplinary action), rev'd on other grounds,No. 94-16415,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34992 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1995).
170. The 1993 Amendments made it clear that the use of videotaped depositions is proper
without prior court approval. See FED. R. CtV. P. (30)(b)(2). If a party chooses to use videotape,
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Occasionally, the deposing attorney will encounter a Rambo attorney
who is blocking access to information due to a misapprehension of the
purpose of the deposition process and the rules that permit an appropriate
inquiry. The deposing attorney needs to be taught to recognize this
opponent.'71 The deposing attorney can be taught how to go off the
record in order to educate the Rambo opponent with a copy of the rules
and interpretative case law. Often, the Rambo opponent will temper his
behavior when he is informed of the sanctions judges have meted out in
other cases.
Finally, the deposing attorney can be taught to effectively warn the
opponent to stop the Rambo behavior; otherwise, judicial intervention
will be sought for the inappropriate behavior. When the Rambo behavior
actually interferes with the acquisition of information, the attorney can
be taught how to make a detailed record of the Rambo behavior for later
use in a motion to compel."7 Of course, when the warning is made, the
deposing attorney must be prepared to seek judicial redress for the
behavior.
These simple provisions and many additional techniques can be
taught to empower the victim to stop the opponent's Rambo behavior.
F Rambo Behavior Should Be Discussed and Condemned
in Law Schools
Law schools need to offer skills training classes that include
vignettes or problem situations in which one attorney encounters a
Rambo opponent in a deposition. Law professors, as well as practicing
attorneys and judges, can then use these vignettes to illustrate ways the
victim of the behavior can respond to disarm the Rambo opponent.
Professors should then facilitate a discussion of why the Rambo
behavior is unacceptable and how the behavior can be stopped. The
discussion should not stop with a listing of potential sanctions, but
however, a transcript must be provided and notice given to the court if the deposition is intended
to be offered into evidence at trial. See id. 26(a)(3)(B), 32(c).
171. See MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 49, at 191.
172. See id. at 197. One of the strategies the authors recommend when dealing with "obnoxious
or obstructionist defending counsel" is to make an accurate record of the deposition proceedings for
later use in demonstrating the incivility of the Rambo lawyer. By using language such as, "let the
record reflect that [opposing counsel] is again [calling the witness or opposing counsel names,
instructing his client not to answer a legitimate question]," the attorney can show the Rambo lawyer
that he is aware of the tactics and does not intend to let him get away with the behavior. Id. The
authors point out, however, that this is an unnecessary tactic when the opposing counsel's tactics are
unsuccessful, "having little effect on the witness's answers." Id.
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should continue with an analysis of how these new attorneys will take
responsibility for ending Rambo behavior.
Professors may find that egregious examples of Rambo behavior,
similar to those documented above, will start the class discussion with a
consensus on the definition of unacceptable behavior. From this
beginning, professors can lead students through a thoughtful analysis of
the causes and remedies for Rambo behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rambo behavior during depositions can and must be stopped. This
Article documents outrageous behavior that most of us can agree is
totally unacceptable. This Article addresses the most extreme examples
to clarify the seriousness of the problem and to define a point of unity
among the bench, bar, and academic world that name-calling, demeaning
gestures, and personal threats are unacceptable in any context.
This Article's secondary goal is to reassure inexperienced attorneys
that they have accessible remedies when they encounter a Rambo at a
deposition. Many attorneys have the mistaken belief that judges will not
take any action to stop obstreperous behavior during depositions. They
believe motions for sanctions are useless. 73 As can be seen from the
many cases described above, judges do take Rambo behavior seriously
and do mete out sanctions to stop the behavior. 74
Once we have a consensus that certain extreme behavior is wrong
and a form of redress is necessary, we can then channel the discussion
into the more difficult subject of methods of stopping the behavior
without resorting to blanket rules and orders that will interfere with
necessary access to information in depositions. Instead of issuing blanket
orders to control the behavior, judges will need to approach each incident
of Rambo behavior on a case-by-case basis.
While these thoughtful discussions evolve, the practicing lawyers
still need protection from the Rambos. Therefore, the solutions this
Article proposes are on two fronts: quick punishment for the current
offender so as to protect the victim, and education and discussions to
find a way to stop the unacceptable behavior, while still preserving the
deposition process.
173. Often when lawyers get to the courthouse, the judge suggests that they "work out their
differences." Minick, supra note 70, at 519.
174. See supra Part IV.E.
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APPENDIX
A. Threats of Physical Violence in a Deposition
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 175 Jack M. Levin, an
attorney, represented himself, with the assistance of his son and associate,
Dennis Levin. The court found that at his deposition, Jack Levin
threatened to
take his questioner's mustache off his face, to give [opposing counsel]
the beating of his life, to slap him across his face, and to break his
head. Respondent also accused [opposing counsel] of behaving in an
undignified and obscene fashion. Respondent addressed [opposing
counsel] in a variety of expletives and otherwise unprofessional terms,
including, but not limited to: "lying son-of-bitch," "asshole," "child and
a punk, .... fat slob," "fucker" and "cocksucker." The proceeding
eventually deteriorated to the point that a local common pleas court
judge threatened to eject the parties from the courthouse. 17 6
B. Insults to Religious Background of Opponent
In In re Williams,177 the following colloquy occurred on the
record, at a pretrial deposition of the plaintiff, when a dispute arose
regarding a witness's right to "review a pleading while being asked
questions about it":
Mr. Rosen: If you're going to hand the complaint to him to coach
him we are going to see the Judge.
Mr. Williams: Just get your foul odious body on the other side.
Mr. Rosen: Then don't show the witness anymore-
Mr. Williams: I'm giving the witness the Complaint-
Mr. Rosen: You're not entitled to coach the witness any further,
you're not entitled to-
Mr. Williams: Don't use your little sheeny Hebrew tricks on me,
Rosen.
Mr. Rosen: Off the record-
Mr. Williams: No, on the record.
175. 517 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 1988) (per curiam).
176. Id. at 893-94.
177. 414 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1987) (en band) (per curiam), appeal dismissed sub noma.
Williams v. Lawyers Prof I Responsibility Bd., 485 U.S. 950 (1988).
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Mr. Rosen: You son of a bitch.
Mr. Cox: Let's call a recess.
Mr. Rosen: Tell the Judge I called him a rotten son of a bitch for
calling me a sheeny Hebrew and I want to go see the Judge right
now.
178
C. The Use of Gutter Language in Addressing Opposing Counsel
In Mink v. Conifer Park, Inc.,'79 the court sanctioned plaintiff's
counsel for his disruptive tactics and use of coarse gutter language in
addressing opposing counsel. 8
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 8 ' the court held that
an attorney's conduct during the deposition in which he engaged in
abusive language, had an abusive demeanor, and made threats, warranted
a public reprimand.
Joseph Jamail and Edward Carstarphen had the following on-the-
record discussion during a 1992 pollution. case against Monsanto
Company, first published in The American Lawyer, as reported by
Benjamin Weiser in The Washington Post:182
Jamail: You don't run this deposition, you understand?
Carstarphen: Neither do you, Joe.
Jamail: You watch and see. You watch and see who does, big boy.
And don't be telling other lawyers to shut up. That isn't your
goddamned job, fat boy.
Carstarphen: Well, that's not your job, Mr. Hairpiece.
(The witness tried to speak, but could not make himself heard.)
Jaxnail: What do you want to do about it, [obscenity]?
Carstarphen: You're not going to bully this guy.
Jamail: Oh, you big [obscenity], sit down.'83
In Mercer v. Gerry Baby Products Co.,1s 4 the court found the
following:
178. Id. at 397-98.
179. 531 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (App. Div. 1988).
180. See id.; see also In re Williams, 414 N.v.2d at 398 (concluding that attorney-respondent
repeatedly engaged in obstreperous, disruptive, and abusive behavior at a panel hearing for
disciplinary proceedings).
181. 517 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 1988).
182. Weiser, supra note 7, at B10.
183. Id. at B12.
184. 160 F.R.D. 576 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (order granting sanctions and appointing special master
to oversee discovery).
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The depositions have been fraught with interruptions, instructions not
to answer and unilateral time limitations. They have included great
moments in legal oratory such as:
Mr. Wallace: "Please sit down, do not hover over the witness."
Mr. Gordon: "Stick it in your ear."
Neither the letter nor the spirit of the Code of Professionalism of the
Iowa State Bar Association... has been met.'85
In Guerrero v. Board of Education,'86 the federal district court
conducted a hearing to determine the appropriate sanctions to impose on
plaintiffs' attorney, Kate Dixon, for her continuing interference in
depositions. Defense attorney Harrington testified that at a deposition of
one of Ms. Dixon's clients, Dixon insulted Harrington when he stood up
to inquire if Ms. Dixon would like a soda or a cup of coffee. At that
point, Mr. Harrington reported that Ms. Dixon "stood up and looked at
me and she said, 'I know what you want, you want to suck Dr. Corona's
cock. You want it up your ass."'187
Another of Ms. Dixon's opposing attorneys, JoAnne Lowe,
described one deposition in which "Ms. Dixon looked like she was going
to come up across the table. She would get up and lean across the table
towards Mr. Giambroni, and on one occasion, I recall her fist being
closed."'188
Finally, the third defense attorney, Francis Giambroni, testified that
Ms. Dixon had called him "an 'asshole' [both] on and off the record at
depositions."' 89
After a lengthy hearing, the federal district court in Guerrero found
twenty-six separate instances in which Ms. Dixon had violated standards
of professional conduct. 9° Eight of the instances had occurred during
depositions, including
swiping a pad of paper at opposing attorney's coffee cup; making
physical contact with opposing attorney; accusing opposing counsel of
desiring to engage in sodomy with a client; making physically
intimidating gestures (leaning across the table with fists clenched);
185. Id. at 577-78.
186. No. C92-2971, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 1994) (order imposing
disciplinary action), rev'd on other grounds, No. 94-16415, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34992 (9th Cir.
Dec. 8, 1995).
187. Id. at *14-15.
188. Id. at *19.
189. Id. at *20.
190. See id. at *33-34.
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calling opposing counsel an "asshole" on and off the record; shouting,
yelling, and calling the questioning attorney names which disrupted the
proceedings, prompting child witnesses to cry; and reciting answers to
a pending question for a witness she was representing, rather than
letting the witness answer.191
In an unusual move, the district court crafted a set of sanctions to
fit the particular offending attorney. After dismissing the complaint
without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief, the court
suspended Ms. Dixon from the practice of law before the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California for a period of two
years in the following cases:
a. Any class action;
b. Any case in which the rights of any minor [were] at issue;
C. Any case [involving the] corporal punishment of minors...;
d. Any case in which the operation and/or administration of any
educational institution... [was] at issue; and
e. Any case [involving the particular opponents of the current
case]. 192
The district court judge then instructed Ms. Dixon to inform all clients
of the order.193
D. Accusations of Mental Problems
In American Directory Service Agency, Inc. v. Beam,194 the
magistrate ordered, prior to the deposition, that certain issues could be
explored in the deposition. 195 During the deposition, Ochs, the defend-
ing attorney claimed that the questions were "'far outside the scope' of
the magistrate's ... Order."'196 When the examining attorney repeated
a question, Ochs delivered the following "diatribe":
OCHS: I know you want... the identity of customers so that you can
go talk to [them]-for what purpose, to harass my client. This is a
harassment case, and when you go to our customers to seek information
191. Id. at *35 n.14.
192. Id. at *44.
193. See id. at *45.
194. 131 F.R.D. 15 (D.D.C. 1990) (order imposing sanctions).
195. See id. at 18.
196. Id. at 18 n.5.
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which has nothing to do with jurisdiction.... I think it is highly
inappropriate.
CLAXTON: You're fantasizing.
OCHS: You are fantasizing with this entire case and listening to a
fantasy woman as far as I am concerned.
CLAXTON: Well, your hang-ups on the personalities involved are your
problem to deal with. I am simply trying to conduct a deposition.
OCHS: You are simply seeking information which [sic] to harass my
clients with. 97
In C & F Packing Co. v. Doskocil Cos.,198 the following exchange
occurred:
Q: ... Have you ever considered what the exposure might be if you
lose this case, ever?
A: On the advice of counsel I'm not going to answer the question.
Q: You can't answer that question for me today, is that right?
A: On the advice of counsel I'm not going to answer that question.
Q: Did you ever sit down with Mr.-by the way is that what you were
told to say after the break?
A: No, I was not given any instructions on the break.
Q: Did you ever sit down and talk with Mr. Doskocil--
MR. MORSE: Mr. Niro, please.
Q: Did you ever sit down a-
MR. MORSE: Because you have paranoia you don't have to take it out
on this witness. We had no discussions about this testimony during that
break.
MR. NIRO: I'm going to ask you for an apology on this record now.
Don't accuse me of any mental illness.
MR. MORSE: You're correct. I apologize.
MR. NIRO: I accept your apology.
MR. MORSE: Forget that I ever accused you of any mental illness.
The record will speak for itself.
MR. NIRO: You should control yourself. If you can't control yourself
in these proceedings, then I suggest we take a break and you can calm
yourself-' 9 9
197. Id. (alteration in original).
198. 126 F.R.D. 662 (N.D. Il1. 1989) (order imposing sanctions).
199. Id. at 684.
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